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8 April 1966

## A CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL STRATEGY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND

By

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A Chinese Communist National Strategy Toward  
Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand

by

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8 April 1966

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## SUMMARY

The Chinese Communists led by Mao Tse-tung captured complete control of the mainland of China in October 1949. A decade and a half later, approximately 700 million Chinese are living under a government intent on reestablishing the China of 1840 and eliminating eventually western capitalistic democracies. This greatly changed Chinese society is essentially the outgrowth of the Eastern world's contact with the dominant and expanding society of the Western world. As the student, this ancient people learned from the mentor. It is, however, still not clear whether the Chinese Communist victory is a complete rejection of the West, a step in accepting aspects of the West, or the latest evolutionary phase in Chinese society. It is the purpose of this research paper to determine what the Red Chinese strategy is toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand and to propose what it may be for the next 15 years.

Research and study, of commonly available unclassified materials, indicate the reasons for Red China's hatred for the western nations and its dedicated effort to achieve power, especially to overshadow the West. For the most part, western influence in Asia and Southeast Asia was in retreat by the end of World War II. Nevertheless, western alliances with the one super power in the free-world camp have stymied Red China's aggressive desires on the areas close to her borders. These areas and internal affairs occupy the bulk of China's efforts.

The leaders of Communist China are not dreamers. They are aware of their Nation's shortcomings in the economic, military, scientific-technological areas and give evidence of great frustrations in not being accepted into the community of Nations. While recognizing that in the past China was subjugated primarily by the nations of Western Europe and Japan, their bellicosity today is directed mostly against the powerful United States. Toward the relatively weaker nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand they can and do take a more lenient attitude--one strictly for the benefit of China. The western alliances preclude direct and rapid achievement of her objectives. Therefore, a more indirect approach exploiting the weaknesses in the western partnerships and stressing peaceful coexistence--selected recognition, controlled cultural and educational contacts, trade, and subversion--is the basic strategy toward these nations.

This study indicates that the Chinese Communists are indeed following a flexible policy and one that is now very similar to the ancient practice of "resorting to peace and friendship when temporarily obliged to do so" while preparing to use war and defense when necessary. Red China's national strategy toward Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand is about as logical as that which any other nation might follow under similar circumstances. Only by likewise following a similar policy toward the United States could more rapid progress be made. This latter shift does not appear to be acceptable to the present leaders of Communist China.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The nations of the Western world have served as the mentors of the world's largest unitary mass of humanity--China. Not unlike individual learners, this colossus of the East has shown a great diversity in its ability to learn from the Western nations by being extremely slow at times and more recently showing qualities of the precocious student.

The outgrowth of this contact, with the dominant and expanding society of the Western world for more than 400 years, was produced more rapidly by the industrial revolution and its disastrous effect upon the old Chinese society. Ssu-Yu Teng, John K. Fairbank and others in a documentary survey of China from 1839 to 1923 concluded:

. . . In the end, the remnants of the old China--its dress and manners, its classical written language and intricate system of imperial government, its reliance upon the extended family, the Confucian ethic, and all the other institutional achievements and cultural ornaments of a glorious past--had to be thrown into the melting pot and refashioned. The old order was changed within the space of three generations.<sup>1</sup>

From the earliest contacts with the West, Chinese statesmen have encouraged adoption of aspects of Western society which would be of most benefit to China in attaining its national purpose and the fulfillment of its rightful place in the world. Although initially a

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<sup>1</sup>Teng, Ssu Yu, Fairbank, John K., and others. China's Response to the West, p. 1.

reluctant learner, the Chinese eventually imitated Western arms, studied the Western world and its uniquely different society, and borrowed from Western institutional and industrial organizations. The leaders of modern China in the period 1839-1923 were basically ethnocentric and China-centered. However, since the rise to power of the Chinese Communists in 1949, this China-centered base has been radically remodeled to a form of China-centered International Communism.

#### CHINESE REDS ASSUME CONTROL

The Chinese Communists, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, gained control of the mainland of China in October 1949. Subsequently, in little more than a decade and a half, China has undergone even more far-reaching, rapid, and thorough change. Fundamental alterations in the entire nature of Chinese society, its political system, its economic structure, its social structure, and the Nation's basic ideology have been made. These changes, significant as they may be, are not the basic reason that other nation-states are concerned about China today.

There is, however, a world-wide uncertainty on what China plans to do with the power and power potential it has as a Nation that already controls almost one-fourth of the world's population and one-sixth of the total land area. The basic purpose of this research paper is to



find an answer to this concern as it relates to Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand; determine what the Chinese Communist strategy towards these Nations is today; and arrive at a logical strategy toward these western and western oriented nations for the next fifteen years.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE CHINESE AND THE WESTERN WORLD

Chinese leaders have long considered their country as the "Central or Middle Kingdom" with a civilization distinctly superior to others. Through four millennia the ancient Chinese society grew and developed. Older values and institutions were replaced gradually by new ideals and institutional forms. Therefore, the China of 1840--the real beginning of western influence--was not the same society as during the period of Confucius and it was considerably different from the medieval China of the neo-Confucian philosophers.<sup>1</sup> For the most part, these changes were produced through internal change and by the influence of other countries within China's immediate world. China's area of influence around 1840 is portrayed by Annex A.

Growing and flourishing for centuries at opposite ends of a continuous body of land, the two distinctly different civilizations of Western Europe and China were barely aware of each other until about the sixteenth century. These early contacts with Jesuit missionaries served to diffuse some western ideas in China and introduced expanded relations with the western world. Elements of mathematics, astronomy, geography, hydraulics, the Calendar, and the manufacture of cannon were accepted by the Chinese. Weapons of warfare, in particular, captured their interest early.

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<sup>1</sup>Teng, Ssu Yu, Fairbank, John K., and others, op. cit., pp. 3, 4.

It was late in the eighteenth century before East and West sensibly impinged.<sup>2</sup> Under these conditions, it is understandable that the dissimilarities would be all the more pronounced and that each would consider the other to be barbarians, infidels, inferior, uncultured, and uncivilized. While both visions were equally inaccurate, it is certain that these distorted portraits continue to exist in both the West and the East and serve to increase the difficulties of communicating with and understanding each other.

Great Britain represented the West in the first real confrontation with the Chinese and by military superiority forced China to open its doors to increased western penetration. Portugal, Holland, and France had established earlier contacts but these were even more transitory in time and limited in place than those of the British whose interest from the beginning was in trade.

By 1842, Britain had insured, in the Treaty of Nanking, that her will would prevail during the subsequent century.<sup>3</sup> In the 50 years following the signing of the treaty, seventeen other foreign powers including Japan, France, Germany, and Russia extracted a wide range of privileges from the Chinese. These included extra-territorial rights, jurisdiction over foreign nationals by their own consuls, exemption from Chinese taxation, special privileges in Treaty ports, low import duties and the absence of levies on exports for foreigners, and complete control and administration of some services by the staff of the foreign power. Hong Kong came into being at this time.

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<sup>2</sup>Luard, David Evan. Britain and China, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 29.



These western legal agreements and successive snatches of Chinese territory fanned a growing flame of Chinese nationalism. A flame that was kept burning by Chinese statesmen, of all political persuasions, whose fundamental objectives were the eviction of foreigners and the re-establishment of China's power.<sup>4</sup>

The western nations started reducing these special privileges in the early 1930's. It was, however, 1943 before Great Britain and the United States relinquished extra-territorial rights with other treaty nations following this lead within the next four years.<sup>5</sup>

ROLE OF WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER WORLD WAR II

While western power on the mainland was almost eliminated by the end of World War II, some western influence in addition to that exerted by the United States still exists in Southeast Asia. In 1962, Great Britain still had colonial possessions in North Borneo and Sarawak. She had close commonwealth links with Malaya, Singapore, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. On September 16, 1963, Malaya, Singapore, and Sarawak joined together into an independent nation--Malaysia. An agreement with Great Britain provided for Malaysia to be a member of the Commonwealth and to receive the protection of the British. In September, 1965, Great Britain decided to remain in Singapore after that nation withdrew from the "Malaysia Federation." She still main-

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<sup>4</sup>Luard, David Evan, op. cit., p. 218.

<sup>5</sup>Lewin, Pauline. The Foreign Trade of Communist China, p. 6.

tains armed forces in Malaysia and in Singapore. The latter includes a big naval base and dockyard, an Army base, and Royal Air Force airfield. Additionally, she maintains rights in Hong Kong until 1997.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, British naval power in the Far East is no longer capable of exerting any great effect on the mainland of China unless Britain is willing to launch the full weight of her nuclear armory. It is more likely, that Great Britain will withdraw even more from the area as reported by Walter Lippmann in December 1965:

. . . Wilson informed us. . . that 'Britain is no longer prepared to maintain a self-contained force with its own weapons, bases and command structure east of Suez. Instead, the Prime Minister has proposed a new collective force to which Britain, America, Australia, and New Zealand would contribute.' . . . The President /of the United States/ was told that Great Britain feels compelled to withdraw from Aden and Singapore on the Asian mainland and to fall back upon a joint base for sea and air power in Australia.<sup>7</sup>

Australia and New Zealand are allied with Great Britain in the protection of Malaysia and accordingly furnish military forces in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaysia under agreement with that country. Attempts to crush Malaysia brought Australia into direct opposition to Indonesia and increased her concern on the rise inside Java of a strong Peking oriented Communist Party.<sup>8</sup> This

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<sup>6</sup>Luard, David Evan, op. cit., p. 220.

<sup>7</sup>Lippmann, Walter. "Wilson, Erhard Visits, Talks Offer Glimpse of Future." The Patriot, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup>Hasluck, Paul. "Australia and Southeast Asia." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1, Oct. 1964, p. 58.

concern abated somewhat following the abortive coup d'etat in Indonesia in September 1965. Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand are vitally concerned with the Southward seepage of communism and, therefore, have assumed an active role in support of the free world's military actions in Southeast Asia.

New Zealand and Australia are, also, aligned with the United States in ANZUS and with the United States, United Kingdom, and France in SEATO. In keeping with these alliances and with the agreement with Great Britain in Malaysia, these western oriented nations help to check the spread of Chinese communism in the Southeast Asian area. Alone, they could not even hope to impede the continued expansion of the Red Chinese.

Although both are island neighbors within the shadows of the colossus to the North (Annex B), there are significant differences between these two western oriented countries and their relation to Asia. New Zealand is more distant in terms of miles and communications, its trade is not with Southeast Asia but is with Hawaii and the Pacific Islands, and its route of communication is through the Panama Canal and not the Suez Canal. Unlike Australia with its great potential as an industrial nation, New Zealand can never really aspire to exert substantial influence on Asian countries.<sup>9</sup>

The power of individual Western European nations or the combined power of Australia and New Zealand with individual European nations

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<sup>9</sup> Larkin, T. C., ed. New Zealand's External Relations, p. 146.



does not now present any serious military problems for the Red Chinese in Southeast Asia. By the end of World War II and the rise to power of the Chinese Communists the nations of Western Europe had started their retreat from the area. Only the United States remains as a significant threat to the expansionist desires of the newest rulers of the mainland Chinese. Therefore, the military alliances between the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand provide the best chance for these nations to stand-up successful against the spread of Chinese directed communism.

Although the extent of western impact on China is not fully known, some early contacts and actions were indelibly planted in the minds of today's leaders in China and have apparently influenced greatly their attitudes toward the West. The inequalities of treaties, the foreign consul's jurisdiction over their nations, the conventional treaty tariff, commercial exploitation, and the treaty ports as center of infection are among those usually mentioned.<sup>10</sup> While most of these results of the "Opium War of 1840" were things of the past by the time the Communists won national power, they did inherit the full force of the aspirations to eliminate the western foreigners from China and all of Asia.

It is still not clear whether the Communist victory constitutes a complete rejection of the West, a step in accepting certain aspects

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<sup>10</sup>Teng, Ssu Yu, Fairbank, John K., and others, op. cit., p. 5.

of the West, or merely the latest phase of a continuing evolution process within the Chinese society.<sup>11</sup> However, pronouncements by the Red Chinese indicate a strong desire and determination to eliminate western influence not only from the Far East but eventually from the earth's hemispheres.

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 2.

## CHAPTER 3

### WESTERN ALLIANCES--NATO, ANZUS, SEATO

The individual 19th century nation-state is no longer a viable unit--economically, politically, or militarily. Recognizing this in relation to the threat of communism, the nations of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4, 1949.<sup>1</sup> Originally composed of 12 North Atlantic nations, it now has grown to 15 member states and encompasses the bulk of the wealth and strength of the free world. As a unit the Atlantic Community forms a producing and consuming area in which about 500 million of the world's most developed people live. Comprising less than one-sixth of the world's population, this group of people command roughly two-thirds of the world's productive capacity to make it the strongest economic combine in the world today.<sup>2</sup>

NATO has served as a cornerstone of the security policies of Western Europe and the United States against the spread of communism. Its obvious success is substantiated by the complete absence of subsequent territorial gains in Western Europe by the Russians. The alliance has provided Western Germany the chance to cooperate with its World War II adversaries in defense of Western Europe against Communist

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<sup>1</sup>Stikker, Dirk V. "No Single Nation Today Can Build Its Future Alone." The General Electric Forum, Vol. 7, No. 2, Apr-Jun. 1964, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>Adams, Walter. A Report on the Strategic Importance of Western Europe. Report to the U.S. Advisory Commission. Washington: U.S. GPO, 1964, p. 5.



aggression. Additionally, NATO's strength has provided the essential shelter for West Europe's economic recovery from the destructive effect of World War II. The Western oriented societies of Greece and Turkey have been sustained and the free world interests of member nations have been advanced.<sup>3</sup>

Although designed initially to halt Soviet Communist expansionism within the area of member countries, NATO nations are expected to assist people throughout the world to remain free. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated on March 6, 1965:

. . . Europe and the North Atlantic Community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe. Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, and the Western Pacific. They have a vital common interest in the free peoples of the developing world in putting an end to aggression by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across national frontiers.<sup>4</sup>

Once again, at the opening session of the three-day meeting of NATO ministers on December 14, 1965, Secretary Rusk reemphasized this responsibility by stating:

. . . the United States war effort in Vietnam was no less vital to them than the commitment to Europe's defense. If the United States abandoned its obligations in Southeast Asia, the Communists might easily be tempted to undertake new adventures elsewhere.<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, eleven NATO members--Italy, the Netherlands, Britain,

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<sup>3</sup> Popper, David H. "NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment." The Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1965, p. 519.

<sup>4</sup> The Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 22, 1965, p. 427.

<sup>5</sup> Braestrup, Peter. "Rusk Tells NATO Asian War Yours." The New York Times, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 1.

Denmark, Canada, Greece, Turkey, West Germany, France, Belgium, and the United States--are providing a measure of economic and military help to the South Vietnamese.

Australia and New Zealand began to look to the United States for protection against aggression during World War II. This relationship drew even closer after the war with the further decline of British and French power, disappearance of Western colonial rule from Southeast Asia and the Indonesian Archipelago, and the growing<sup>6</sup> might of the Chinese Reds.

On September 1, 1951, the United States joined with Australia and New Zealand in the ANZUS Treaty to protect the interest of each signatory nation against armed attack in the Pacific area. Three years later on September 8, 1954, seven nations joined with the United States in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), or Manila Treaty of 1954, whereby each nation would act together in response to armed attack against any member. The United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan and the United States are<sup>7</sup> members of this collective arrangement.

The ANZUS, SEATO, and NATO alliances between the nations of Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States give the free world the framework on which various actions may be taken to

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<sup>6</sup>Hasluck, Paul. "Australia and Southeast Asia." Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1964, Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 53.

<sup>7</sup>US Army War College Reference Manual. "Organization of the US Government for National Security." Part II, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Aug. 1, 1965, p. 107.

thwart Russian and Chinese Communist expansionism in Europe, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Western Pacific.

#### OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIVISION

Despite the strength of the free world alliances, the following offer some chance for exploitation by the Chinese Communists:

- . The differing national interests, pride, and traditions of the 15 member nations of NATO, three members of ANZUS, and the eight members of SEATO.

- . The idea that as a world superpower, the United States must defend Western Europe from communism regardless of the effort and cooperation expended by the countries of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

- . Individual, group, and national frustrations over the affluent United States and its scientific and technological superiority.

- . The feeling of some Europeans that the United States is an upstart nation and should not be involved in European affairs.

- . The belief by some West Europeans that even Great Britain should not be involved fully in the affairs of continental Western European nation-states.

- . Uncertainty and tensions over the role to be played by nations of Western Europe in NATO nuclear strategy and command.



. The hostilities between Western Allies, i.e., Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

. The attitude toward Red China and Nationalist China and toward the present conflict in Southeast Asia--South Vietnam.

. The general European recognition of communism as the permanent socio-political order for mainland China and the unwillingness of the United States to accept this view.

. The divergent policies and interests of member nations, i.e., Portugal's policies of white supremacy in Angola and Mozambique, and cultural and trade relations with Communist countries.

. The yearning for relief from constant war preparations and the accompanying chance to improve individual living standards through peaceful means by the people of advanced Western nations.

The western world's open invitation to exploitation was expressed by Stefan Thomas Possony in a 1961 report, "Wordsmanship: Semantics as a Communist Weapon," as follows:

. . . the free world must be deceived about the true means and ends of Communism and must be induced to believe in the humanitarian and progressive motivations and intentions of the Communist movement.

The Communists are trying to entrap us by the words which we like best. They are attacking democracy where it is weakest; in its predilection for wishful thinking. . . . In order to survive, the democracies have nothing to lose but their short memories.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Possony, Stefan Thomas. "Wordsmanship: Semantics as a Communist Weapon." Statement to Congressional Subcommittee. Washington: US GPO, 1961, p.18.

Although elements of division between Western European nations do exist and such elements may be open for carefully controlled exploitation by the Chinese Communist, the basic objectives of the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand remain unchanged. Confronted with a real threat to vital western ideals by Chinese directed expansionism, the nations of the West would close ranks against the common foe.

## CHAPTER 4

### EXPLOITATION OF WEAKNESSES IN WESTERN RELATIONS

Today's rulers of the People's Republic of China are concomitantly idealists and pragmatists. Their ultimate aim is to establish a world-wide totalitarian system under the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist party elite. This is to be accomplished by seizing power everywhere by any means possible, including war if required. They intend to destroy democracy, eliminate capitalism, liquidate opponents, and abolish individual freedom.

Red China faces a long and difficult struggle to achieve its objectives at home and abroad. Her greatest wealth is manpower--uncontrolled this may, also, be a serious weakness. In all other areas of national power, China lags far behind the western world despite the notable, and in some cases spectacular, progress in certain fields during the past 16 years. Therefore, Communist China pursues relatively peaceful and flexible economic, political, socio-psychological courses with the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand to build China and split the powerful western partnership.

To accomplish Red China's long-range herculean task, adroit use is made of the special interests and weaknesses in the western camp. Selected individual and group tours of China, cultural and educational exchanges, a continuous flow of propaganda within and without



China, and managed trade relations are the means used to deal with these western nations.

#### INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP TOURS

A recent visitor inside Communist China, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University, wrote about his trip in the Washington Post on November 14, 1965. He acknowledged that during the entire three weeks the tour was completely controlled by ignorant guides who with others subjected the group to incessant propaganda. He concluded that the Chinese do not really want to understand England or English ideas and experiences.

His article extolled some of the Red Chinese accomplishments, as follows:

. . . The grim, efficient, antiseptic new China is the first Asiatic colony to have turned itself, by its own efforts, into an industrial great power. Such an achievement can seduce even its critics.

Sophisticated Chinese intellectuals may hate the bone-headed bureaucratic tyranny of the party, the extinction of free thought and free speech, the suffocation of the arts, the severance of human contact; but they cannot fail to recognize that the same party has restored--at whatever price--national independence, national greatness, national pride.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Trevor-Roper indicated that aggression by the Chinese Reds now and for the next generation is remote and concluded that:

If Capitalism in the rest of Asia is detached from colonialism we may well find in 20 years that the Chinese revolution too will have been absorbed;

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<sup>1</sup>Trevor-Roper, Hugh. "All's So Smugly Right in Red China." The Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965, p. E4.

that history will have reasserted its claims and "coexistence," from heresy, will have become orthodoxy in Asia too.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that this individual visitor may have performed well the objectives established by the Chinese Communists to highlight those ideas which democratic countries regard highly--national independence, national greatness, and national pride. While at the same time glossing over the cost in equally desirable objectives. Additionally, this report would lead us to believe that left alone the Chinese under communism would revert to a desirable nation within the world community of nations within 20 years.

Mr. Jules Roy, one time French Air Force Colonel and member of the French left, visited Communist China in 1964 and was greatly disillusioned. According to the report in Newsweek magazine, October 18, 1965, Mr. Roy states:

China's love of peace is a lie. I know that the Emperor Mao Tse-tung, founder of the new People's Dynasty, and the sad, silent valets of his court dream only of revenge.<sup>3</sup>

Obviously, the Red Chinese are not entirely successful in their efforts to weaken the western relations through controlled visits.

#### SELECTIVE RECOGNITION, TRADE, AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

In 1945, Mao Tse-tung considered the United States as his greatest problem in foreign affairs. He believed that the United States

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. E4.

<sup>3</sup>"China; The Jilted Lover." Newsweek, Oct. 18, 1965, p. 58.

planned to take the place of Japan and degrade China to a colony. This unsupportable belief in combination with the reality of the power of the United States in Asia and its assistance to Chiang Kai-shek caused Chinese Communist hatred to be directed toward the United States. Great Britain, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands were not treated in the same offensive manner and, therefore, recognized the Communist regime prior to the Korean War in 1950. President Charles de Gaulle of France extended recognition of the regime on January 27, 1964.<sup>4</sup>

The national interests of West European nations toward Red China are quite different from those of the United States. Most West European nations consider the revolution as final and feel that trade with the Red Chinese is alright. The leaders of China have been quick to recognize and use this weakness in the solidarity of the West to the maximum. West European nations generally agreed with the United States on a list of over 400 militarily important items which they would not sell to Red China at the time of the Korean War. This resolution, however, was scrapped by Great Britain and several other West European nations by 1956. The United States still does not trade with Red China. Additionally, Peking conducts trade with Australia, Canada, West Germany, and Italy even without their recognition of the Communist Chinese regime.<sup>5</sup> Her desire for political

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<sup>4</sup>Lee, Oliver M. "Communist China and Western Europe." Current History, Sep. 1964, p. 143.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 146.



acceptance by these western nations may be an important factor in promoting trade relations, but certainly it is not the sole reason.

The first moves toward greater freedom in selection of markets took place about 1956-57, prior to the official Sino-Soviet split. The relaxation of tension following the Korean War hastened the move toward expanded trade with the countries of Western Europe. However, this was not the only reason. Some needed capital goods were either not available from socialist countries or the quality, prices, or other conditions were considered undesirable. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade in 1955, Mr. Yeh Chi-chuang stated China's large demand for metals, machinery, scientific instruments, petroleum oils, rolling stock, shipping, requirements in general industry and transportation, and some articles for individual daily use.

England, France, and West Germany were visited by various Trade delegates during 1957-58. By 1958, the Western European nations had taken over the former position of the Soviet Union as the chief suppliers of steel. Imports from Western Europe concentrated on sheet steel, tinplate, special steel and other steel products which may have been of higher quality than that of the Soviet Union. Since 1961, Chinese foreign trade with the capitalist countries has dominated over trade with socialist countries.

Western European exports to China fell steadily from about 400 million dollars in 1958 to about 150 million in 1962. This was

in large measure because of the 1958 failure in the "great leap forward." By 1963, trade with the West had started upward.<sup>6</sup>

With the eclipse of Russian influence about 1960, western industrialists have been working hard to find out what the Chinese market holds for them. In 1963 China's vice-minister of Foreign Trade, Lu Hsu-chang, visited Western Europe and Great Britain, and contacted delegates from France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

The United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and France are China's most important trade partners in Western Europe. Also, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Sweden have been significant suppliers of steel in the 1956-60 period. Canada and Australia made major sales of wheat to China in 1963 and Canada has signed a three year agreement for the sale of a minimum of 112 million bushels of wheat during the next three years.<sup>7</sup>

By 1960, a series of orders for complete plants were consummated with Western European countries--primarily chemical fertilizer, chemical fibre, and oil refining plants. Although natural disasters and self-examination caused the leaders of Red China to give priority in order to agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry which is tied to modernization of agriculture, contracts have been completed with Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, France, West Germany, Austria, and Sweden for complete plants. The reasons for these actions were

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<sup>6</sup>Lewin, Pauline. The Foreign Trade of Communist China, p. 37.

<sup>7</sup>"China Signs Deal on Canada Wheat." The New York Times, Oct. 28, 1965, pp. 61, 68.

the need for speed, to learn from the advanced experience of foreign countries, and to absorb superior western technology. Despite this action to purchase from the West the stress in China is still on "self-reliance."<sup>8</sup>

The year 1965 was a period of continued build-up of Red China's trade with Western countries. China's export surplus in the Hong Kong market registered a 33 percent increase in the first half of 1965 to 69 million pounds. During this period her trade with Great Britain rose, also, by 33 percent. Britain sold more synthetic fibres, copper, and machinery of all kinds--except aircraft. China, in return, sold more soyabeans, wool, and greycloth--but less tin. Great Britain's new labor government made an important gesture last November by sending its President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Douglas Jay, to open the British Trade Exhibition in Peking. Although this had been previously promised, it was undertaken against some American and Indian disapproval. The Chinese have bought more machinery and less steel from Britain with the emphasis on machine tools, telecommunications equipment, road vehicles, and scientific instruments. China supplied more food products to the British. The 1965 mood of Sino-British trade was one of steady optimism.<sup>9</sup>

France increased trade with China by 50 percent in 1965; however, the greatest increase was made by West Germany and Italy. Diesel

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<sup>8</sup>Yamanouchi, Kazuo. "Changes in Markets in Chinese Foreign Trade and Their Background." The Developing Economies, Vol. III, Sep. 1965, p. 296.

<sup>9</sup>Wilson, Dick. "Turning Point in Trade." Far Eastern Economic Review, Sep. 30, 1965, p. 611.



locomotives and several complete chemical plants were to be supplied by West Germany. Most of the Scandinavian countries exchanged trade delegations with Communist China in the period. Two 14,500 ton freighters are on order from Britain, a 10,000 ton freighter and a 10,500 ton passenger vessel and nickel ore from France, and one freighter from Holland.<sup>10</sup>

Hong Kong continues on its amicable and mutually beneficial basis with China. East-West relations are interrupted only occasionally by unavoidable incidents which require the Chinese to speak out against the Western imperialists. The continuing spirit of co-operation with Communist China was shown when China began furnishing water to the colony on 1 March 1965. The project was completed by about 15,000 Chinese workers, six months sooner than expected, and consists of six dams, eight pumping stations, and 52 miles of channels.

British Hong Kong imports most of its food from mainland China. This amounts to about 1,000 million dollars each year with 535 million already purchased in the first six months of 1965. Live animals, fruits, vegetables, sugar, rice, eggs, fish, and meat are the type goods imported for internal use. Other items are imported for re-export in various forms. The Chinese Communists have modern department stores in Hong Kong and regularly undersell other establishments. The Red Chinese appear to be using Hong Kong as

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 612.

a test-market for their export consumer goods. They are gaining experience in producing and marketing items which should help them to capture the markets in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the world. Besides a wide range of consumer goods, China exports quantities of hard industrial goods such as basic machinery, iron, and steel bars and rods, and cement.<sup>11</sup>

Group interests of various types are exploited. Regulated cultural exchanges are conducted with Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. During 1957-58, twenty-two Chinese students went to West Germany and eight studied in England. On August 30, 1965, a 10-member delegation of Chinese students left Peking by air to attend the 13th international cultural festival of College students in France.<sup>12</sup>

This is not intended as a complete record of cultural exchanges in the period, but merely to point out another tool used to enhance the growth of China and divide the West. Although Australia and New Zealand stand in much the same relation to Red China as the United States, they both now have limited cultural contacts through controlled visits. Such visits are for the most part made by individuals and groups sympathetic to the views of the Chinese Communists.<sup>13</sup>

The Communist Parties within countries of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand offer another opportunity to split the Western partners. This is an extremely limited opportunity since the

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<sup>11</sup>Bonavia, David. "Hongkong Market Place." Far Eastern Economic Review, Sep. 30, 1965, pp. 623-624.

<sup>12</sup>Daily Report, Far East, No. 168, Aug. 31, 1965, p. BBB13.

<sup>13</sup>Passin, Herbert. China's Cultural Diplomacy, p. 54.

Communist parties of Western Europe are essentially dominated by their pro-Moscow leadership. Each does, however, have its "China Lobby." In France and Italy the parties are especially torn by the conflict between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking groups. The French leaders favor expelling the Chinese from the Communist camp but cannot because of a dissident pro-Peking group. Not even President de Gaulle's recognition of Red China stopped the pro-Pekingites from demanding a return to purer Leninist principles of violent revolution. Likewise, the Italian party has a strong China group. Rome is especially important to the Red Chinese as a point of contact with parties in Tunisia, Algeria, the United Arab Republic, and Latin America.<sup>14</sup>

There has always been a special relationship between the Communist parties of Australia and New Zealand. This relationship was marked by an open split in 1960 with the Australian Communist party deciding to remain pro-Moscow and the New Zealand party choosing to follow a pro-Peking line. However, neither are important in the world Communist movement and both are without real strength even in their own country.<sup>15</sup>

It appears that the Chinese Communists are focusing their main attention and action in an area which takes advantage of the national interests of the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New

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<sup>14</sup>Steibel, Gerald L. "Red China Versus the World." The American Legion Magazine, Vol. 77, Aug. 1965, pp. 10-13.

<sup>15</sup>"Free World Area Background Papers: Australia-New Zealand." Radio Free Europe-Research Department, Jul. 15, 1964, p. 1.

Zealand and of basic disagreements between western partners.

At the same time trade with the West provides much needed help in developing her agricultural and military bases, while increasing China's industrial capabilities for both the short and long run. Also, this approach assists the Red Chinese in their efforts to convince some of the Western democracies that she desires to pursue peace and friendship with all nations. Through these varied contacts, Red China hopes to encourage the withdrawal of western influence from Southeast Asia and acceptance of Red China as the world representative of the Chinese people. Accomplishing this would spot Red China on the threshold of obtaining her long range objective--a Communist world looking to the Chinese for leadership.



## CHAPTER 5

### AN ANALYSIS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL OBJECTIVES TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND

On September 3, 1965, Lin Piao, vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central committee, vice premier, and minister of national defense, in commemorating the 20th anniversary of Chinese victory over Japan reiterated Mao Tse-tung's political and military thoughts for the people's wars. He stressed wars of annihilation, protracted fighting, guerrilla warfare, and the establishment of rural base areas, and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them. He applied the latter to Western Europe, as follows:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the cities of the world then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the rural areas of the world.<sup>1</sup>

Such an analogy openly and arrogantly communicated to the world in combination with his stated support of the Marxist-Leninist theory of proletarian revolution form a clear vision of the world-wide desires and violent aggressive designs of the Chinese Communists.<sup>2</sup>

Richard Louis Walker in his 1958 book, The Continuing Struggle, wrote that the Red Chinese wish to split and weaken the camp of the enemy, establish firmly and clearly their leadership in Asia,

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<sup>1</sup>"Lin Piao Article Commemorating V-J Day Anniversary." Daily Report-Far East (Supplement). Sep. 3, 1965, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

solidify the control and influence of all Chinese, and convince the world that time is definitely on the side of the Chinese Communists.<sup>3</sup>

China's long-range ambitions may be to forge a Chinese Communist world-dominating force from a combination of Chinese manpower, Japanese industrialization, and Indonesian natural resources according to Charles Meeking Canberra.<sup>4</sup>

Helmut G. Callis writing on "China, Asia and the West" in 1960 determined that Red China's modern imperialism is based on the nationalistic desire to restore the ancient Chinese empire, that the Western power--the United States--and China will be drawn into prolonged conflict which will set the basic tenor of world politics for the foreseeable future, and that the Soviet Union could be the winner if open and large scale conflict erupts between these two powers.

The well-planned incidents in Korea, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladhak, and Laos are steps in China's dream of restoring the old Chinese empire. Through such actions, the Reds hope to attain their short-range objectives, and reach toward longer-range ones without resorting to the large-scale military action taken by Hitler and Tojo. The Chinese have from their earliest history been quite aware of the possibility of "softening up" a person or a people. Infiltration, subversion, and division of western allies is the most likely approach for the Chinese Communists.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Walker, Richard Louis. The Continuing Struggle, pp. 53, 56, 66.

<sup>4</sup>Canberra, Charles Meeking. "Australia-Defence Worries." Eastern World, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>Callis, Helmut G. China, Asia and the West. Institute of International Studies: University of Utah, 1960, p. 5.

In 1962, R. G. Boyd identified Red Chinese national objectives as self preservation, use of external resources for national development, expansion of Chinese power and influence abroad primarily by indirect aggression, and encouragement of Soviet aggressiveness toward the West. These objectives would be achieved through protracted struggle, peaceful coexistence, cooperation with and competition against the USSR, and a continued expression of belligerence directed against the imperialists.<sup>6</sup>

In 1962, Chou En-lai expressed that the general foreign policy line of the Chinese People's Republic was to develop friendly relations of mutual help and cooperation with Communist countries, to seek peaceful coexistence with countries regardless of their social system, oppose the aggressive and war policies of the capitalistic imperialists, and to support people's revolutions. In September, 1962, Mao Tse-tung stated the main points of China's foreign policy as follows:

- . . . continue to uphold the banner opposing imperialism and safeguarding world peace, and unite all peace-loving countries and peoples in the world to form a more extensive united front to oppose the American imperialists and their running dogs in various countries.
- . . . continue to uphold the revolutionary banner and lend positive support to the struggle for the liberation of the people in various countries. . . .
- . . . continue to uphold the banner of proletarian internationalism and strive to

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<sup>6</sup>Boyd, R. G. Communist China's Foreign Policy, pp. 85, 86.



safeguard and strengthen solidarity in the socialist camps and the Communist international movement, Communist China also deems it necessary to continue to uphold the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism, insist on the revolutionary principles of the Moscow Declaration of 1960 and firmly and categorically opposes modern revisionism which is the major threat to the Communist International movement. This is a major task for the present and for a long time to come; there is at the same time the need firmly and categorically to oppose dogmatism, factionalism, big nation chauvinism and narrow nationalism; this is another long-term task. In sum, all this is in order to fight for preserving the purity of Marxism and Leninism.<sup>7</sup>

Frederick S. Burin discussed in the June, 1963, American Political Science Review China's views on war as inevitable. Wars of all type according to the Chinese, will occur as long as capitalistic imperialism exists. Local wars of "wars of liberations" are essential for revolution and the continued expansion of communism. Larger wars and especially wars between Capitalistic countries will probably occur to further the cause of communism.<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Charles Patrick Fitzgerald, professor of Far Eastern History in the Australian National University, Canberra, assessed the Chinese Red's policies toward the West in his book, The Birth of Communist China. He concluded that it was the western powers that instructed

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<sup>7</sup> Union Research Institute. Communist China Problem Research Series. Communist China, 1962, Vol. 1, pp. 73, 105.

<sup>8</sup> Burin, Frederic S. "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War." The American Political Science Review, Vol. LVII, Jun. 1963, p. 353.



the Chinese in the "right of might." In the early 1930's the western nations discussed at length the elimination of the unequal treaties. They could not agree, however, on what should be done. Gradually the Chinese began to believe that force was the only way for them to regain their lost power. This belief was substantiated in the minds of the Chinese when in 1937 the Japanese struck and drove through the western legal documents and eliminated the questions on extra territorial rights, concessions, leased territories, and other special privileges. Again, the Chinese felt the importance of military power and concluded, "Had China concentrated not on diplomatic arguments but on the building of a strong army, she would have recovered her lost rights very quickly and without trouble."<sup>9</sup>

According to Mr. Fitzgerald the Europeans have accepted the Chinese revolution as final, the Americans have not. It would, therefore, seem logical for the Red Chinese to use the Manchu foreign policy practice of playing off one barbarian against another. For some reason the Reds did not initially choose to do this; however, since 1960 it appears that this policy has been partially followed and, to a degree, has split the solidarity of the western partners. Possible reasons for initially treating the British with disdain were to teach the Chinese people that the West should no longer be regarded with respect or affection, to show mistrust of the British

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<sup>9</sup>Fitzgerald, Charles Patrick. The Birth of Communist China, p. 200.

as the ally of America, or in response to a Russian request that they not be too friendly with the West. It is more likely that the Chinese Communists recognized the relative insignificance of Western European nations as a power in the Far East and changed their strategy for the benefit of Red China.

He assesses the foreign policy of the Chinese Reds towards the western powers to be specially tailored to each nation in varying shades of hostility. Towards Britain who has dissociated herself from the more extreme policies of America:

. . . There may be a reserved and chilly intercourse, largely due to the mutual benefits of trade and the common value of Hong Kong to both countries.

Towards France. . . . Mao has said; one of the present realities is that France on many major issues opposes the U.S.A. The opponent of my enemy is not far from becoming my friend. So late in 1963. . . China and France were coming together, at least to the extent of fostering trade and perhaps 'cultural relations. . . .<sup>10</sup>

This relationship with France has continued to grow and has now blossomed forth with France's recognition of the Chinese regime in January 1964. .

Towards the rest of the Western world, Australia, Canada, Holland, and the European democracies of Scandinavia and Belgium, the attitude of the new Chinese government resembles that adopted towards Britain, with slight modifications of favour or disdain, dependent on the policy of recognition or nonrecognition. The Chinese consider these countries as more or less satellites to America; those who show more independence are given slightly better and

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

more cordial treatment; those who follow the American line closely are ignored.<sup>11</sup>

Towards West Germany, China's trade increased greatly in 1965, but according to Chen I, in a September 24, 1965, press conference, conditions are not right for official trade relations. West Germany is too friendly with the United States and still desires to reunite Germany at the expense of the East German Communist nation.

Daniel Tretiak writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review for September, 1965, stated, "The main focus of Chinese foreign policy remains Asia, although Africa continues to be an area of high interest for the Chinese leadership." He further indicates that West Europe retains its importance, to China, especially for the economic maneuverability afforded through trade.<sup>12</sup>

#### NUCLEAR POLICY

In October 1964, the Chinese Communists exploded a nuclear device in Sinkiang. This achievement alone may not have altered the Red's national objectives toward Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand; nevertheless, it has afforded them good reasons for changing their overall foreign policy statements and has probably added leverage to their capability of attaining their objectives by providing more flexibility to their strategic capabilities.

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 219.

<sup>12</sup>Tretiak, Daniel. "Foreign Problems." Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 14, Vol. XLIX, p. 615.



Writing in the Irish Defense Journal, Cosantoir, in September, 1965, Niu Sien-chong illuminates the chameleon-like policies of the Chinese Reds toward nuclear weapons before and after their successful explosions.

In July 1963, they proposed a conference of governmental heads to prohibit nuclear weapons and even destroy those already produced. About October 22, 1965, their position had changed to meet the conditions of the time and were as follows:

1. The development of nuclear weapons is for the purpose of opposing the American Imperialist's nuclear monopoly, nuclear blackmail and nuclear intimidation policy.

2. China would never use her nuclear weapons initially under any circumstances.

3. China demands that a conference of the governmental heads should be held immediately to discuss the problems of the complete prohibition and radical destruction of nuclear weapons. As a first step, the heads of all nuclear powers should agree not to employ nuclear weapons initiatively under any condition.<sup>13</sup>

This is a more ambiguous and flexible policy than the one expressed in July 1963. It is also more favorable to continued testing and production of nuclear weapons. On November 22, 1964 the People's Daily carried an article, "The New Starting Point of Seeking All-out Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." Accordingly the Chinese policy was expressed in five points, as follows: First, China opposes the complete nuclear test ban as the beginning of

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<sup>13</sup>Sien-chong, Niu. "The Nuclear Policy of Red China." Cosantoir, Sep. 1965, p. 450.



complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. This would permit continued testing as a means of accumulating an adequate stockpile. Second, China opposes the destruction of delivery systems as the first important step toward complete nuclear disarmament. This is not so much a guarantee to the security of China as it is an impediment to the development of her own delivery system. Third, China opposes establishment of a nuclear free zone which she had in the past favored. Fourth, China refuses to participate in the Geneva disarmament negotiations. And fifth, China refuses to participate in the meeting of the five nuclear powers.<sup>14</sup>

#### LONG AND SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

There appears to be general agreement among Western writers and scholars that the Chinese desire to reestablish the power position of the "Middle Kingdom" or the sphere of influence of China which existed prior to Western encroachment in the early 19th century. Others believe with their new found national unity and power growth that their long-range goals are more far reaching--to include a world order under the central direction of exalted Chinese Communism.

The latter is not considered attainable within the time frame of this paper--1965-1980--and, therefore, must be considered only as a long-range goal. It is interesting to note that France's

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 451.

President Charles de Gaulle is reportedly convinced that China within two generations will be an enormous super power.<sup>15</sup>

A totalitarian regime with aggressive designs would formulate detailed time-phased plans to achieve their goals. All aspects of national power--economic, political, military, sociological-psychological, and scientific-technological--would be appropriately considered to insure the feasibility of such plans. From an analysis of the writings reported in this paper and considering the national power of Red China, their objectives toward Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand may be as follows:

Long-range. (These would not be attainable within the next decade and a half.) Domination of Western Europe primarily through military and political power. Complete domination of Australia and New Zealand with these countries included as the outer defensive arc in an Asian Security Organization.

Short-range. (These are feasible goals for the next 15 years.)

. Eliminate all West European influence and power from Southeast Asia, except the British business and trade activities in Hong Kong.

. Divide and weaken the western capitalistic powers while simultaneously increasing the power of the People's Republic of China.

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<sup>15</sup>Sulzberger, C. L. "Foreign Affairs: Russia, China and Their Turks." The New York Times. Nov. 26, 1965, p. 34m.

. Increase Communist infiltration, subversion, and division within the countries of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

. Surpass the nations of Western Europe in all elements of national power--especially, military might.

. Gain acceptance by western nations of China's nuclear capability and belief in her willingness to use it only in self defense.

. Gain full Western European support for Communist China as the China to be represented in the United Nations.

#### COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO RED CHINA TOWARD THESE NATIONS

The power of Red China is, like all other nations, conditioned by what it is, in people and national consciousness; by what China has, in material resources and land; and by its position in relation to other nations and their allies. The Chinese people under Communist leadership have made remarkable progress in the past decade and a half. Without doubt, Red China is today a powerful force in the world, but it has not attained that great or super power stature which would permit her to disregard other great powers and speed directly ahead to attain her ultimate goals.

The nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand allied with the power of the United States serve as most formidable opponents to the aggressive plans of the Chinese Communists. This is almost

certain to be fully understood by the pragmatic leaders of Red China. Therefore, they would logically make a complete inventory of the elements of China's power and, thereafter, consider various courses of action open to them toward these nations, and select the one considered best for their requirements. The following are considered to be courses of action open to them:

COURSE I. Ignore these nations because of their current relative lack of importance in the Asia and Southeast Asia areas.

COURSE II. Place the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand in the same category as their ally, the United States, Take the same bellicose attitude toward them and pursue the same hard policy, to include the immediate elimination of the British from Southeast Asia.

COURSE III. Pursue a policy of co-existence by establishing trade, diplomatic, and cultural relations with them. This would be done on a graduated scale according to the specific needs of China.



## CHAPTER 6

### PRESENT CHINESE COMMUNIST NATIONAL STRATEGY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND

The Chinese Communists have apparently decided, for the time being, on a course of action highlighting "peaceful co-existence" with the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. This diplomacy of "co-existence" serves four valuable purposes: (1) to deflect attention from the aggressive expansionist aspects of Chinese communism, (2) to appeal to those of the western world who are eager to hear expressions of peaceful intent, limited objectives, and statements supporting the humanitarian and progressive motivations of the Chinese Communists, (3) to take advantage of weaknesses in the western partnership and widen the split between these western and western oriented countries and the United States, and (4) to help China build her agricultural and light and heavy industrial bases.

Presently, China's nuclear capability is of dubious military and political importance in her strategy toward these countries which are relatively far from the mainland of China. But, as a psychological element of national power it has been used in an effort to convince these and other nations of her scientific and technological knowledge and strength.

The Chinese Communists have not budged from their dedication to world revolution. Such long-range plans calling for continued

expansion and revolutionary war can be pursued on a wide-scale only from a position of great strength. This requires time; therefore, it is necessary that concerted effort be made to divert the attention from this long-range goal to actions of a humanitarian and progressive nature which will capture the support of certain groups within the countries of the West. Expansion through indirect aggression toward neighboring nations may be pursued without totally jeopardizing this policy.

Peking's "peaceful co-existence" policy appeared to take on new importance following the internal setbacks in 1958 and the break with the Soviets in 1960. Subsequently, a softer political line has been pursued towards the British, French, Italians, West Germans, Australians, and New Zealanders. This does not reflect a major shift in China's objectives, but merely a more logical approach in her struggle for equality with the industrialized West, her desire to divide the western partners, and in her goal of eventual destruction of western capitalism.

To expand communism, and especially Chinese-directed communism, China desires the earliest removal of western influence from Asia and Southeast Asia. The United States is the only western democratic nation with sufficient powers to stand between the Red Chinese and complete attainment of this goal. It appears that Great Britain will continue to withdraw from the area East of Suez.

China alone does not have the military power to remove the United States and, certainly, she could not do it against the combined strength of Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The role that the USSR will play in helping or hindering China is uncertain. Therefore, she follows a "peaceful co-existence" policy with these nations in order to give Red China the time and assistance needed to build her national power, widen the gap in the relationship of the western partners, and continue to support "wars of national liberations."

At present, China's hatred of the West and its capitalistic democratic form of government is directed toward the United States. Only when necessary to "save face" with the people of Asia and South-east Asia does she make open verbal attacks on the British "imperialists." Meanwhile China pursues a graduated system of reserved and chilly intercourse with nations of Western Europe based on the closeness of the countries with Peking's hate symbol--the United States--and, also, on what China needs from the country. A similar course of action is followed toward Australia and New Zealand. Australia serves as a source of supply for wheat and some wool and in the long-range view is an area capable of accommodating part of the expected overflowing Chinese population. Trade relations, limited cultural exchanges combined with a few Chinese students studying in western nations, and use of the pro-Peking factions of Communist parties in these countries are the general areas of contact. Thus, we can see that China's actions toward Western Europe, Australia, and New



Zealand are appropriately within the framework of Mao Tse-tung's strategic principles, which include:

- . Relativity principle--that each nation is considered in accordance with its relative importance in and around China, its relationship to the US, and what is has that China needs to move ahead.

- . A centrally directed strategy that permits China to take the initiative and maneuver, as required, to meet the needs of the People's Republic of China.

- . Dialectic principle--in a long-term conflict, with the free-world, China does not want large scale military operations. She prefers the slow undermining of the Western World's strength; therefore, China works her little against the opponents much. The strategy in both the military and political areas is to "scorn the enemy."

- . Primacy of politics--political action is considered "war without blood" and is taken first before any attempt is made to resort to "politics with blood"--war.

- . The principle of surrounding and defeating the cities from the country side--the nations of Western Europe from the under-developed areas of the world.

The Red Chinese are now too involved in Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries on their borders to have immediate designs on Australia or New Zealand. Both are remote from China and are separated from the mainland by ocean and land areas not now



controlled by the Chinese Communists. As a result, these western oriented countries are most likely farther down on Peking's schedule of communization than the countries on her periphery but not as far in the future as Western Europe.

Such reasoning is, however, of little comfort to the Australians and New Zealanders who are uncertain about the British staying in Singapore, Malaya and the Borneo states. They are aware of Red China's sacrifices in building its war-making potentials, both conventional and nuclear. This added to the continued speculation on Red China's efforts to foment and support uprisings in these areas cause Australia and New Zealand to maintain military forces thousands of miles from their homelands.

Another major objective of the Peking regime is to convince the people of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand that Red China is clearly the leader in Asia.<sup>1</sup>

The Chinese Communists told delegates to the Communist dominated Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Cairo in 1957 that China would overtake the British by 1972. This has apparently served as a motivating factor for the Chinese people and according to Peking stimulated the most popular song hit in China during 1958--"Catch Up With Britain."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, it appears that the Peking strategy vis-a-vis Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand is one of "peaceful co-existence."

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<sup>1</sup>Walker, Richard Louis, op. cit., p. 56.  
<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

One that is dedicated to a struggle for equality, continuing divisions of western strength, and a persevering aim at total destruction of western capitalism. Its immediate line stresses increased trade and "peaceful co-existence" offensive to benefit the further growth of its political and military strength while emphasizing the United States as the major block to western peace and friendship with China.

#### OTHER FEASIBLE STRATEGIC POLICIES

Strategy A. Adoption of a hard-line "anti-imperialistic, anti-colonialistic, anti-neocolonialistic" strategy toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. This would correspond to the policy currently followed in Red China's relations with the United States of America.

. Psychologically the hard-line Red Chinese national strategy toward the United States has, most likely, achieved successes both within China and in the hearts and minds of certain "have-not" peoples. Contrarily, it has served, in varying degrees, as a cohesive factor for those people and nations who have flourished under a system of freedom.

. Politically and economically this hard-line approach toward the recognized leader of the free world has served as a drag on the forward progress of the Communist controlled Chinese people. Recognizing that by 1949 the United States was the only western capitalistic power capable of thwarting her expansionist desires,

the leaders of Red China decided to direct the bulk of its hatred for the West toward its leader. As a result, the Chinese Communists have been in return the subject of an equally hard-line policy from the United States. This enmity toward the West has resulted in the withholding of certain diplomatic relations and trade, particularly in strategic materials. These have worked to retard China's relations with nations and her industrial and military development.

. Conclusion. Adoption of a hard-line stance toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand would probably enhance the value of the current psychological results from such a strategy toward the United States. It would, however, serve to stop the present much needed flow of western achievements in agriculture and industry to China. This trade with the nations of the West is of special importance in filling the gaps left by the Sino-Soviet split. To achieve China's internal objectives of better living, rapid industrialization, and forward progress, it is essential that such trade be carried on until China has attained greater self-reliance. As a by-product, the practice of according different treatment to these countries serves to whittle away at the powerful United States. Thus, this policy would serve to further reduce the immediate industrial and military growth of Red China, to further degrade world opinion toward China, to solidify the western partners against her, and to further reduce the chances for admission of Red China into the United Nations Organizations.



Strategy B. A decision to opt for a soft-line "co-existence" strategy toward the United States without significantly altering the current course of action with the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

. Politically and economically this soft-line approach toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand has benefited Communist China. It has provided a way to feed her growing population and to progress toward a sounder industrial base. It has served to split and weaken the western camp by providing for selected trade agreements with certain western nations. Many of these have been completed over the opposition of other western nations. Although certain strategic materials are still unobtainable, there has been a continuous eroding of the hard-line policy against such sales in the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. This soft-line toward selected western nations has served, also, to split the western partners on recognition and acceptance of Communist China in the United Nations.

. Psychologically, the soft-line toward selected countries permits the Reds to convince the Chinese of their sincerity in and willingness for peace and friendship with other nations. Also, such selected actions show the Chinese that they are not sufficiently powerful to control these relations and that the western nations are not invincible. It gives them a means--controlled tours--of showing to the world those elements of China that they desire to let outsiders see.



. Conclusion. It is expected that adopting a softer policy toward the leading western nation would permit a faster breakdown in the barriers to unrestricted trade. It would enhance the opportunity for acceptance of China in the United Nations and a concomitantly elevated status in the view of the developing nations. Thus, this policy would serve to increase the immediate and long-range industrial and military growth of Red China, to elevate world opinion in favor of the Chinese, to encourage greater freedom for the nations of the western camp to trade with China, and open the door for acceptance into the United Nations.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE RED CHINESE NATIONAL STRATEGY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND, 1965-1980

At the outset of this paper the relation of the nations of Western Europe and the colossus of the East--China was analogized as that of mentor and student. No doubt both have learned and changed significantly in the past century and a quarter, since their real confrontation in 1840; but, the most remarkable transformation is surely in the student. Western scholars, diplomats, and soldiers have endeavored without measurable success to understand what the Chinese and their present leaders gained from their close contact with the West. How much these leaders and other Chinese have learned from the western nations is uncertain. Yet, we can logically reason that what was learned has not been entirely constructive for the people of the East or the West.

The foreign policy of China in 1861 toward the western powers resembles greatly that which may be the policy for the next decade and a half--especially, toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. The new foreign policy of January 1861 acknowledge that the western nations did not covet Chinese territory and people. And, thus concluded:

. . . we can still through faithfulness and justice tame and control them /the West/ while we ourselves strive towards recovery. . . . If we do not restrain

our rage but continue the hostilities, we are liable to sudden catastrophe. On the other hand, if we overlook the way they have harmed us and do not make any preparations against them, then we shall be bequeathing a source of grief to our sons and grandsons. The ancients had a saying, "Resort to peace and friendship when temporarily obliged to do so; use war and defense as your actual policy."<sup>1</sup>

Today, China under Communist leadership is dedicated to a long-range goal of seizing power world-wide. She does not now have the power to do this and analysis indicates strongly that Red China will not have the capacity for attaining this ultimate objective in the immediate future. Certainly, she cannot expect to achieve this objective within the next fifteen years.

Red China's current strategy toward the nations of Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand is not an intricate oriental Machiavellianism. To the contrary, research and study of unclassified materials lead to the belief that, for the most part, her strategy toward these countries is as logical as that which any other nation would follow under similar circumstances. This Communist colossus is without doubt progressing at a rapid rate under the current "peaceful co-existence" strategy with these nations as depicted by Annex C.

Chinese hatred for the western world would logically, by western standards, be expressed most vehemently toward those West European

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<sup>1</sup> Teng-Fairbanks, China's Response to the West, p. 48.

nations that most flagrantly violated the sovereignty of China, during the past century. However, recognizing the diminishing power status of these former colonial imperialistic nations, Red China's leaders decided to funnel the bulk of this hatred toward the one western power that stands as the obstacle to fulfillment of her dreams. They resolved, therefore, to treat the West European nations with measured disdain while using them to expedite achievement of China's National Objectives.

Red China's objectives toward Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand during the next 15 years may be expected to remain essentially as follows:

- . Elimination of western influence from Southeast Asia, except the British in Hong Kong.
- . Divide and weaken the western partners, primarily through increased trade and cultural exchanges on a controlled basis.
- . Surpass the nations of the West in industrial and military power.
- . Gain full and active support for China's early acceptance in the United Nations.
- . Increase Communist infiltration, subversion, and division within these countries.

Additionally, during this period, Red China will press for closer ties with Australia and New Zealand. Emphasizing the proximity of these nations to China vis-a-vis the West, Red China will



strive particularly for the acceptance of increased Chinese migration to Australia.

Red China's national strategy toward these western nations will continue to emphasize economic, political, psychological, and scientific-technological elements. However, increased psychological use will be made of China's growing military capability. US Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara addressing the NATO ministers in December 1965, reportedly stated:

. . . Chinese Communists. . . would produce enough fissionable material in the next two years to start a small stockpile of atomic weapons.

Moreover, the Chinese, despite a 'near famine' economy, are spending 10 per cent of their gross national product on defense.<sup>2</sup>

He, also, indicated that Red China would have an operational medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, by 1967; several launchers deployed by 1969; and an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting Europe, by 1975.<sup>3</sup>

Despite increased stress on military matters, Red China's main rapport with Western Europe will most likely be in the field of trade. With an economic slowdown in much of Western Europe, the nations of France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have boosted their exports sharply in 1965.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Red Chinese strategy will make

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
<sup>2</sup>Braestrup, Peter. "McNamara Warns NATO of China's Atom Threat." New York Times, Dec. 16, 1965, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>Segal, Harvey H. "Europe's Nibbling at our Trade Surplus." The Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1965, p. L7.

maximum use of this capitalistic economic slowdown and increase imports of materials previously needed, but not available to her.

It is not likely that Communist China will reverse its hard-line strategy toward the United States, but will continue to pursue the unbending course of the past 16 years. They have not forgotten the western lessons on the importance of military power. The Communist-led People's Republic of China would move toward their goals at increased speed if they could turn from this hard line, adopt a softer policy toward the leader of the Free World, and further relax relations with Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. China would then be considered by more countries as the true proponents of world peace and friendship.

  
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
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
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




# CHINA - 1966



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## 1966 - RED CHINA

- FOLLOWS A STRATEGY OF CONTROLLED TRADE AND CULTURAL RELATIONS TO BUILD CHINA FOR AGGRESSION
- RECAPTURING HER 1840 SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
- SUPPORTING WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION